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ABSTRACT—In domestic sex trafficking, the trafficker often promotes a 
victim to the coveted position of “lead prostitute,” or “bottom.” Once in 
this position, the victim engages in acts for which she can be prosecuted 
under federal sex trafficking statutes that carry ten- and fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum sentences. To recognize bottoms’ victimization and 
resulting lack of genuine agency, this Note proposes a Sentencing 
Guideline safety valve provision. Creating a safety valve would provide 
sentencing judges with necessary discretion to impose sentences below 
statutory floors in appropriate cases.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Keosha Jones, a twenty-one-year-old woman, held two fourteen-year-
old runaways in a hotel room, capitalizing on the girls’ distance from home 
and lack of means to support themselves in order to force them to work as 
prostitutes for her and her pimp, Derrick Hayes.1 Jones purchased clothes 
for the girls, posted advertisements online (calling the girls “[t]wo ebony 
princesses that like to . . . have fun any way u want”), solicited clients for 
their sexual encounters, set the prices, took phone calls to set up their 
“dates,”2 and collected all of the money that they earned.3 At one point, 
Jones hired a man to hurt one of the girls “real bad.”4 
Federal prosecutors indicted Jones for these acts under federal sex 
trafficking statutes that carried mandatory minimum sentences of fifteen 
years.5 Jones, however, cooperated against Hayes and helped the 






5 For an in-depth discussion of the federal sex trafficking statutes, see infra Section I.C. 
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government indict and convict him.6 Because of her cooperation, Jones 
spent only six months behind bars instead of fifteen years.7 This may seem 
incongruous; if Jones did so much to retain, advertise, and hurt her minor 
victims, then why did the government not prosecute her to the fullest extent 
of the law? The simple answer is because the two girls were not the only 
victims in this scenario. Jones was Hayes’s “bottom girl” (or “bottom” or 
“bottom bitch”), the prostitute most loyal to him and with the most 
responsibility among his “stable” of prostitutes.8 What she did to the girls, 
she did at Hayes’s command. Hayes also forced Jones to engage in 
prostitution for him, requiring her to give him both her own and the girls’ 
earnings.9  
As Hayes’s bottom, Jones was at the top of the hierarchy of his 
prostitutes, but Hayes did not spare her from brutal beatings inflicted to 
keep her under his control.10 Hayes completely controlled Jones, and she 
regularly endured physical and verbal assaults.11 Jones met Hayes when she 
was fifteen.12 She believed he loved her.13 The abuse began when Jones 
refused to have sex with Hayes, so he beat and threatened her until she 
succumbed.14 Hayes soon forced Jones into having sex with strangers, and 
she became addicted to drugs and dropped out of school.15 Hayes beat her 
frequently, often choking her until she passed out.16 Jones ended up in the 
emergency room many times.17 When she tried to escape, Hayes would 
track her down, beat her, and threaten her and her family.18  
Learning of the abuse that Jones endured at Hayes’s hands makes her 
more sympathetic; clearly, it is easy to see her as a victim.19 Nonetheless, 
Jones, like most bottoms, committed similar trafficking offenses against 
6 Silvestrini, supra note 1. 
7 Id.  
8 Id.; Karen Zraick, 8 Charged in Brooklyn in Sex-Trafficking Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/nyregion/03sextraffic.html [https://perma.cc/V7PV-DLDB]. For 
an in-depth discussion of bottoms, see infra Section II.B.  
9 Silvestrini, supra note 1. 









19 Even Jones’s sentencing judge noted that “[s]he, in a very real sense, is a victim herself.” 
Silvestrini, supra note 1. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
756 
other underage victims. Does this make her a victim or a perpetrator?20 No 
black and white answer exists: the fact that traffickers strip bottoms of their 
“agency”21 to force them to become perpetrators themselves is enveloped in 
shades of gray.22 Traffickers routinely employ abuse and manipulation to 
strip away bottoms’ agency, so that they will perform virtually any act at 
their trafficker’s command. Many of those acts committed by the bottoms 
constitute federal crimes prosecutable under various sex trafficking 
statutes. 
To explain the often-conflicting goals of responding to victims’ needs 
and prosecuting human trafficking perpetrators, Part I of this Note 
examines the history of human trafficking legislation in the United States, 
specifically the Mann Act and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
(TVPA) of 2000. Part I examines the elements of both acts’ attendant sex 
trafficking statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422, and 2423. Finally, Part I 
surveys the statutes’ hefty mandatory minimums and high sentencing 
guidelines ranges.23 
In Part II, this Note provides background on how traffickers target 
vulnerable victims, and describes the deceptive, violent techniques that 
traffickers use to recruit, groom, and maintain their victims. In addition, 
Part II describes the bottom’s role within a trafficker’s commercial sex 
operation, including the bottoms’ roles as both victims and perpetrators 
who commit trafficking offenses on behalf of their traffickers.  
Part III acknowledges that many prosecutors understand the 
complexities attendant to the offenses bottoms commit on behalf of their 
traffickers and therefore do not charge bottoms with statutes that carry 
mandatory minimums. Prosecutors do, however, often leverage the 
possibility of bringing these more severe charges in order to pressure the 
20 Throughout this Note, victims, including bottoms, are referred to with female pronouns, and 
traffickers with male pronouns. Certainly not every trafficking situation follows those gender norms—
victims can be boys and men and traffickers can be girls and women; however, because the typical 
trafficking situation follows the male trafficker and female victim model, this Note uses the 
corresponding pronouns for simplicity.  
21 As used throughout this Note, “agency” means the “[a]bility or capacity to act or exert power” 
independently. Agency, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2012).  
22 See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 6, United States v. Evans, No. 2:09-cr-00196 (E.D. Wis. 
July 17, 2012) [hereinafter Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, Evans] (quoting the bottom’s statement 
during allocution that “[i]t’s bad that the law only sees things in black and white and that they feel that 
you always have a choice”). 
23 Although United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), provided judges with discretion in 
applying the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, it did nothing to limit the harsh effect of a mandatory 
minimum sentence. See, e.g., Hon. Victoria A. Roberts, Federal Sentencing Post-Booker, MICH. B.J., 
Dec. 2007, at 31 (“While expanding discretion, Booker did not give trial courts discretion to depart 
below mandatory minimums in the absence of § 3553(e) motions.”).  
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bottoms to cooperate and testify against their traffickers, which can be 
extremely traumatic for bottoms. Because charging decisions are the sole 
prerogative of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, there is currently no mechanism 
in the system to counterbalance this prosecutorial power. This is the 
impetus behind the changes proposed in Part IV. 
Specifically, in Part IV, this Note suggests adding a statutory safety 
valve to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) for trafficking victims 
who perpetrate trafficking offenses. Such a safety valve would allow 
prosecutors and courts to address with greater specificity any factors 
relevant to sentencing bottoms fairly. It also would give defense attorneys 
an opportunity to argue that mitigating factors exist, as well as afford 
defense attorneys greater leverage in plea negotiations than they currently 
have. Additionally, it would give courts necessary discretion when 
sentencing bottoms, the vast majority of whom have committed trafficking 
crimes under duress from their traffickers. The proposed amendment would 
make it more feasible for the government and bottoms to work together to 
prosecute the most culpable perpetrators.  
I. HUMAN TRAFFICKING LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, sex trafficking is the most common form of
human trafficking.24 Until 2000, federal prosecutors generally charged 
human trafficking under statutes criminalizing involuntary servitude,25 
peonage,26 or enticement into slavery.27 However, these laws were too 
narrow to give adequate relief to victims, the victims themselves often were 
criminalized, and they could not access services to recover from being 
trafficked.28 Further, the involuntary servitude and slavery statutes apply 
24 John Elrod, Note, Filling the Gap: Refining Sex Trafficking Legislation to Address the Problem 
of Pimping, 68 VAND. L. REV. 961, 963 (2015). The National Human Trafficking Hotline, operated by 
Polaris, received reports of 5,736 total cases of human trafficking as of September 30, 2016. Of those 
reports, 4,177 were of sex trafficking, 824 were of labor trafficking, 204 were of sex and labor 
trafficking, and 543 were not specified. Hotline Statistics, NAT’L HUMAN TRAFFICKING HOTLINE 
(2016), https://humantraffickinghotline.org/states [https://perma.cc/P3YT-NBZ2]. There is no official 
estimate of the number of human trafficking victims within the United States; however, Polaris 
estimates that the number is in the hundreds of thousands when adult and child victims of both sex and 
labor trafficking are aggregated. The Facts, POLARIS PROJECT (2017), https://polarisproject.org/facts 
[https://perma.cc/G4YP-N2BY]. The Hotline learns of an increasing number of human trafficking cases 
each year. Id.  
25 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2012); Jennifer A.L. Sheldon-Sherman, The Missing “P”: Prosecution, 
Prevention, Protection, and Partnership in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 117 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 443, 451 (2012).  
26 § 1581; Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 25, at 451. 
27 § 1583; Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 25, at 451; see BRIDGETTE CARR ET AL., HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING LAW AND POLICY 109 (2014).  
28 CARR ET AL., supra note 27, at 109. 
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only to physical coercion, failing to reach subtler forms of coercion (i.e., 
psychological coercion),29 which are common to modern trafficking.30 
Prosecutors had also used the Mann Act of 1910 to prosecute trafficking 
crimes.31 The Mann Act prohibited transporting individuals in interstate 
commerce to engage in prostitution,32 but it proved insufficient to 
criminalize the broad range of modern trafficking offenses.33 To address 
these shortfalls, Congress enacted the TVPA, which it amended and 
reauthorized in 2003, 2005, 2008,34 2013,35 and 2015.36 Federal prosecutors 
use statutes created by the Mann Act and the TVPA to prosecute 
traffickers, and charging decisions are often dictated by the suitability of 
the facts to the statutes’ different requirements.37 Traffickers convicted of 
violating either the Mann Act or the TVPA face high sentencing guideline 
ranges and often ten- to fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentences.38 
A. The Mann Act
The Mann Act—originally known as the White Slave Traffic Act—
focused on the prosecution of those who transported women or girls “for 
the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral 
purpose.”39 The Act did not provide protective services for prostituted 
women and men and, in fact, it has been used to force victims to cooperate 
with federal prosecutions.40  
29 United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988). 
30 Mark J. Kappelhoff, Federal Prosecutions of Human Trafficking Cases: Striking a Blow Against 
Modern Day Slavery, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 9, 13 (2008). Of course, psychological coercion has always 
played a significant role in illicit trafficking. CARR ET AL., supra note 27, at 97. 
31 §§ 2421–2424; Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 25, at 451. 
32 Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 25, at 451. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 467 n.194. 
35 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 136. 
36 Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, 129 Stat. 239. 
37 See Elrod, supra note 24, at 969. 
38 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b), 2423(a) (2012).  
39 Pub. L. No. 61-277, § 2, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–2424 
(2012)). The Mann Act was the product of a highly moralistic “white slavery” campaign in the 1900s 
that analogized prostitution to the history of the African slave trade in the United States. See Cheryl 
Nelson Butler, The Racial Roots of Human Trafficking, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1464, 1489–90 (2015); see 
also Jonathan Todres, Prosecuting Sex Tour Operators in U.S. Courts in an Effort to Reduce the Sexual 
Exploitation of Children Globally, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 5–11 (1999) (providing an in-depth history 
of the Mann Act).  
40 For a discussion regarding the way in which the government has used the Mann Act as a tool not 
to protect victims, but rather to force their cooperation, see infra Section III.A. 
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In 1986, Congress expanded the Mann Act to recognize that 
traffickers also could transport males for commercialized vice.41 The 
amendment also replaced the terms “debauchery” and “other immoral 
purpose” with “any sexual activity for which any person can be charged 
with a criminal offense.”42 Prosecutors now may use the Mann Act to 
prosecute persons who transport victims of any gender across state lines or 
in foreign commerce for prostitution or other illegal acts of commercialized 
unlawful sexual activity for which the victim could be prosecuted.43  
B. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act
Given the limited scope of the Mann Act, Congress decided to pass 
broader legislation to address human trafficking. The TVPA is the first 
comprehensive federal legislation to address human trafficking and to assist 
victims.44 The TVPA’s purpose is “to combat trafficking in persons, a 
contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly 
women and children.”45  
As the name suggests, the heart of the TVPA addresses the 
victimization of trafficked persons. The current TVPA provides funding for 
programs aimed at assisting victims to obtain housing, psychological 
counseling, legal assistance, and other services.46 The House Report notes 
that the Secretary of State, as part of the annual Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices, should report whether governments of countries which are 
the “origin, transit, or destination for a significant number of victims of 
severe forms of trafficking . . . refrain[] from prosecuting victims of severe 
forms of trafficking and from other discriminatory treatment of such 
victims due to such victims having been trafficked.”47 This demonstrates 
Congress’s recognition that victims should not be held accountable for acts 
they commit because of their victimization, although a similar reporting 
requirement does not exist for domestic prosecutions. However, given that 
41 Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 5, 100 Stat. 3511, 3512 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2424 (2012)); CARR ET AL., supra note 27 at 109. 
42 § 5, 100 Stat. at 3512. 
43 § 2421; Mohamed Y. Mattar, Interpreting Judicial Interpretations of the Criminal Statutes of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Ten Years Later, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1247, 1251 
(2011). 
44 MARY A. LENTZ, LENTZ SCHOOL SECURITY § 13:11, Westlaw (database updated 2015). 
45 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2012). 
46 Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 119, 129 Stat. 227, 247 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5611 (2012)). 
47 H.R. REP. NO. 106-487, pt. 2, at 5–6 (2000). 
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another aim of the TVPA is to prosecute people who commit trafficking 
offenses, things quickly become more complicated.48  
C. Sex Trafficking Statutes
The TVPA provides prosecutors with a powerful criminal provision 
for charging sex traffickers: 18 U.S.C. § 1591. However, as explained 
below, prosecutors often struggle to prove all elements of § 1591 and 
therefore frequently choose to prosecute traffickers under the Mann Act’s 
more easily satisfied provisions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(b) and 2423(a). The 
requirements of each statutory provision are detailed below.  
Although the specific elements of § 1591 are difficult to prove, § 1591 
is broad in scope, criminalizing any conduct related to or benefiting from 
domestic sex trafficking.49 It specifically prohibits “recruit[ing], entic[ing], 
harbor[ing], transport[ing], provid[ing], obtain[ing], or maintain[ing] by 
any means,” or benefiting financially or obtaining anything of value from 
participation in a venture that causes a person to engage in a commercial 
sexual act.50 The TVPA also criminalizes attempts51 and conspiracies to 
engage in trafficking, making them punishable in the same way as a 
violation of the substantive offense.52  
Prosecutors must prove different elements to convict a person of 
trafficking an adult as opposed to trafficking a child. To be convicted of 
sex trafficking an adult, a trafficker must have used “force, threats of force, 
fraud, coercion . . . or any combination of such means” to compel the adult 
victim “to engage in a commercial sex act.”53 There is no force, fraud, or 
coercion element in cases charging sex trafficking of minor children.54 
Nonetheless, in most modern sex trafficking cases, the trafficker uses at 
48 Id. at 6. 
49 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2012). 
50 Id. Because of the requirement of force, fraud, or coercion for adult victims, § 1591 does not 
reach the adult porn industry. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. However, people who benefit 
from causing a minor to produce child porn, which necessarily involves a sex act in the production, 
have been prosecuted under § 1591. See United States v. Adams, 789 F.3d 903, 907 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(upholding a mother’s conviction under § 1591 where the mother knew or recklessly disregarded the 
fact that her daughter would be photographed nude and made to engage in a sex act in exchange for the 
mother’s morphine pills, although the jury acquitted the mother of the charge of producing child 
pornography).  
51 § 1594(a). 
52 Id. § 1594(c). Conspiracies to violate § 1591 do not carry the same mandatory minimum, and 
one convicted of conspiring to violate it shall be fined, “imprisoned for any term of years or for life,” or 
both. Id. Therefore, this Note’s proposed sentencing safety valve is not needed at sentencings on 
§ 1594(c) conspiracy convictions.
53 Id. § 1591(a)(2).
54 Id. 
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least one of the above methods to compel adult and child victims to engage 
in commercial sex acts.55  
Courts have interpreted “force” to mean, “any form of violence, 
compulsion or constraint exercised upon or against a person.”56 A trafficker 
may use force and coercion to create a “climate of fear” that causes a 
victim to obey the trafficker out of fear of provoking further violence.57 In 
§ 1591, “fraud” is a “deliberate act of deception, trickery, or
misrepresentation.”58 Fraud includes typical recruitment and grooming
techniques, such as false promises to treat victims well, to allow them to
stop prostituting themselves, to buy them expensive gifts, or to love, marry,
and start a family with the victim.59 Section 1591 defines “coercion” as
(a) threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; (b) any
scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to
perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any
person; or (c) the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process.60
Witnessing violence against other victims can convince victims that they 
must obey their traffickers or face such wrath themselves.61 
Although sex trafficking is prevalent in the United States, historically, 
it has been under-prosecuted, in large part because sex trafficking cases are 
difficult to prove.62 Proving force, fraud, or coercion often requires 
testimony from the victims, which can be difficult to elicit because of the 
55 See, e.g., United States v. Alaboudi, 786 F.3d 1136, 1139–40 (8th Cir. 2015) (trafficker beat an 
underage victim with nunchucks, punched her in the face, and threatened to kill her unless she did what 
he wanted); Osley v. United States, 751 F.3d 1214, 1219 (11th Cir. 2014) (trafficker beat an underage 
victim and put a gun in her mouth); United States v. Lewis, 791 F. Supp. 2d 81, 84 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(trafficker choked, hit, and stabbed an underage victim with a knife when she refused to obey him).  
56 United States v. Webster, Nos. 08-30311, 09-30182, 2011 WL 8478276, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 
2011).  
57 Stephen C. Parker & Jonathan T. Skrmetti, Pimps Down: A Prosecutorial Perspective on 
Domestic Sex Trafficking, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 1013, 1035 (2013).  
58 United States v. Paris, No. 03:06-CR-64(CFD), 2007 WL 3124724, at *14 (D. Conn. Oct. 24, 
2007). 
59 Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 57, at 1035–36; 2 Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 104, 115, 
116–18, 121, 128, 139, United States v. Sawyer (Sawyer I), No. 10 CR 744 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2011) 
[hereinafter Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Sawyer I]. 
60 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(2) (2012). 
61 Brief of Appellee at 10, 12, 13, 15, 19, United States v. Sawyer (Sawyer II), 733 F.3d 228 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1912) [hereinafter Brief of Appellee, Sawyer II] (describing how a trafficker brutally 
beat his victims in front of each other very often, which stuck in their minds in vivid detail and made 
them afraid to disobey him); Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 57, at 1036–37.  
62 Elrod, supra note 24, at 970–71 & 971 n.70 (citing Lauren Hersh, Sex Trafficking Investigations 
and Prosecutions, in LAWYER’S MANUAL ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING 255, 256 (Jill Laurie Goodman & 
Dorchen A. Leidholdt eds., 2011) (“Effective prosecution of sex trafficking cases is an extraordinarily 
challenging task.”)).  
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relationship between victims and their traffickers.63 Traffickers groom their 
victims through a cycle of comfort and violence that results in traumatic 
bonding,64 which makes many victims unwilling to testify against their 
traffickers.65 Indeed, sometimes trafficking victims testify for their 
traffickers.66 Other victims refuse to cooperate with law enforcement 
because they fear retaliation from their traffickers.67 Even when trafficking 
victims testify for the prosecution, some factfinders discount their 
credibility due to their backgrounds, holding the view that only children 
who are morally blameless qualify as genuine “victims” of trafficking.68 
Compounding the prosecutors’ proof problems, law enforcement often 
faces difficulty securing sufficient corroborating physical and digital 
evidence to support the victims’ testimony.69 This, combined with 
unwilling, reluctant, or untrustworthy witnesses, means that it is a 
significant challenge for prosecutors to meet their burden of proof as to 
traffickers’ use of force, fraud, or coercion.70 Therefore, some prosecutors 
63 See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, Evans, supra note 22, at 18, 20 (recognizing the 
possibility that the government could not have made its case without securing the bottom’s testimony); 
Elrod, supra note 24, at 971 & n.74 (citing Hersh, supra note 62, at 256, 262 (noting the “complexity of 
the victim-trafficker relationship” increases the difficulty of prosecuting trafficking cases)). 
64 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFFICE ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, FACT SHEET: SEX
TRAFFICKING (Aug. 2, 2012), http://http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/endtrafficking/resource/fact-
sheet-sex-trafficking-english [https://perma.cc/FD6Q-HH6B]; see Megan Annitto, Consent, Coercion, 
and Compassion: Emerging Legal Responses to the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors, 
30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 15 (2011). The traumatic bonding that victims experience sometimes 
develops into Stockholm Syndrome, causing small acts of kindness to amplify in the victim’s psyche. 
Elizabeth Hopper & José Hidalgo, Invisible Chains: Psychological Coercion of Human Trafficking 
Victims, 1 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 185, 199 (2006). 
65 See Krystle M. Fernandez, Victims or Criminals? The Intricacies of Dealing with Juvenile 
Victims of Sex Trafficking and Why the Distinction Matters, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 859, 885 (2013) (noting 
the frequency with which minor victims refuse to cooperate with law enforcement). 
66 See Brief of Appellee, Sawyer II, supra note 61, at 15, 17 (noting that the victim testified as a 
witness for the trafficker, saying that she still loved him, she had lied to him about her age, and he had 
not forced her to work as a prostitute, and also noting that a second victim testified for the defendant 
and said that he did not know her age and that he did not traffic her by force).  
67 See AMY FARRELL ET AL., NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., IDENTIFYING 
CHALLENGES TO IMPROVE THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF STATE AND LOCAL HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING CASES 108–10 (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238795.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MZ24-HYEF]. 
68 See Moira Heiges, Note, From the Inside Out: Reforming State and Local Prostitution 
Enforcement to Combat Sex Trafficking in the United States and Abroad, 94 MINN. L. REV. 428, 452 
(2009).  
69 See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 67, at 110–13. 
70 See Elrod, supra note 24, at 969, 971–72; MARK MOTIVANS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS DATA BRIEF: FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING, 2001–2005, at 1 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpht05.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G6K7-E9F7] (noting that from 2001 to 2005, prosecutors declined to prosecute 
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prosecute cases under § 1591 only if there are multiple victims, in order to 
increase the likelihood they will uncover credible witnesses willing to 
testify.71 Others choose to bring charges under the TVPA only in cases 
involving minor victims so that they do not have to prove force, fraud, or 
coercion.72 In cases without multiple victims or minor victims, prosecutors 
often eschew the TVPA and choose instead to charge traffickers under 
statutes with elements that are easier to prove.  
Yet, these difficulties in proving the elements of § 1591 lead to the 
continued prosecution of traffickers under the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2422(a), even though Congress designed the TVPA to address human
trafficking and to serve as the statutory basis for prosecuting trafficking in
persons.73 Prosecutors find the Mann Act appealing for two reasons. First,
§ 2422(a) does not include the elements of force, fraud, or coercion.74
Second, in the case of adult victims, as long as the trafficker “persuades,
induces, entices, or coerces” the victim to travel in interstate or foreign
commerce to engage in prostitution or any other sexual activity for which a
person can be charged with a criminal offense, “or attempts to do so,” the
trafficker has violated § 2422(a).75 When minor victims are involved, a
prosecutor can charge a trafficker under either § 2422(b), which is identical
suspects in 222 trafficking matters, and that lack of sufficient admissible evidence was the second-
leading cause for these decisions after lack of evidence of criminal intent). 
71 FARRELL ET AL., supra note 67, at 198–99.  
72 Id. at 198–99. 
73 See Elrod, supra note 24, at 969.  
74 See Jessica Neuwirth, President, Equality Now, Statement to the New York City Council (June 
11, 2008), http://www.equalitynow.org/node/10691 [https://perma.cc/MGS3-LD2U] (noting that the 
Department of Justice brings most trafficking cases not under § 1591, but rather “under the Mann Act 
because the Mann Act does not require proof of ‘force, fraud or coercion’”). 
75 The government must satisfy the element that the trafficker “persuade[d], induce[d], entice[d] or 
coerce[d]” the victim, which—by definition—can be satisfied by proving coercion. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a) 
(2012). Proving persuasion, inducement, and enticement is an easier burden than the “force, fraud, or 
coercion” requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. See Mattar, supra note 43, at 1251–52 (discussing the 
lower burden of proof the government must meet to satisfy the elements of the Mann Act); see also 
United States v. Hite, 769 F.3d 1154, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (The “ordinary meanings of the verbs 
persuade, induce, entice, and coerce demonstrate that § 2422(b) is intended to prohibit acts that seek to 
transform or overcome the will of [the victim].”). The court looked to dictionaries to understand the 
meanings of the words, which, for example, define “persuade” as “[t]o induce or win over (a person) to 
an act or course of action; to draw the will of (another) to something, by inclining his judgement [sic] or 
desire to it; to prevail upon, to urge successfully, to do something,” or “to win over by an appeal to 
one’s reason and feelings, as into doing or believing something.” Id. (first citing OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989); and then citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)). The court also 
noted that the inclusion of “attempt” in § 2422 is significant in making the government’s burden easier 
to meet. Id. at 1162. The court held that in the case of § 2422(b), the interaction does not even have to 
be with the victim, but rather can be through an adult intermediary “so long as the defendant’s 
interaction with the intermediary is aimed at transforming or overcoming the minor’s will in favor of 
engaging in illegal sexual activity.” Id. at 1160. 
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to § 2422(a) but applies to victims under eighteen, or § 2423(a), which does 
not contain the “persuades, induces, entices, or coerces” element, and only 
requires that the trafficker knowingly transport a minor victim in interstate 
or foreign commerce to engage in prostitution or other punishable criminal 
sexual activity. Similar to the prosecution of a defendant charged with 
trafficking a minor under § 1591 of the TVPA, the government does not 
need to prove force, fraud, or coercion under §§ 2422(b) or 2423(a). 
Prosecutors often charge defendants—traffickers and purchasers or 
solicitors of sex with minors—with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b), 
or 2423(a), or a combination of the three.76 
D. Sentencing Persons Convicted of Trafficking Offenses
Both the TVPA and the Mann Act provide strict penalties, including 
lengthy mandatory minimum sentences.77 If a defendant is convicted under 
the TVPA, 18 U.S.C. § 1591, for trafficking a victim under the age of 
fourteen, or for using “force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion” while 
trafficking an adult or minor victim age fourteen or above, then the 
defendant receives a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years in 
prison without parole, and could receive up to life in prison.78 If the 
trafficker is convicted of trafficking a minor between the ages of fourteen 
and eighteen without force, fraud, or coercion, the mandatory minimum 
sentence drops to ten years without parole, but the possibility of life in 
prison remains.79 Under the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(b) and 2423(a), 
if a trafficker is convicted of persuading, inducing, enticing, coercing, or 
transporting a minor to engage in prostitution or other criminal sexual 
activity, he receives a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. Although a 
conviction of transporting an adult to engage in prostitution under 
§ 2422(a) does not carry a mandatory minimum, it permits a sentence of up
to twenty years.80
76 See, e.g., United States v. Wilmer, No. 3:12-CR-00107-BR, 2013 WL 1500698, at *1 (D. Or. 
Apr. 11, 2013), aff’d, 595 F. App’x 685, 687 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that the pimp was charged with 
violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2421, 2422(b), 2423(a), and 2423(e) for trafficking two underage girls). 
77 Even post-Booker, if the government does not make a U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 5K1.1 or 
§ 3553(e) motion because the defendant provided substantial assistance, the court cannot use its
discretion to impose a sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum. See Roberts, supra note 23, at
30, 31. See also infra notes 195–98 and accompanying text for an in-depth discussion of when
prosecutors make § 5K1.1 motions for substantial assistance.
78 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1) (2012). 
79 Id. § 1591(b)(2).  
80 Id. § 2422. 
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The U.S.S.G.81 also impose harsh sentences for sex trafficking: the 
statutes’ base offense levels combined with the typical enhancements that 
accompany sex trafficking convictions82 often put defendants into 
Guidelines ranges well above the mandatory minimums.83 The Guidelines 
calculate sentencing ranges in months.84 Without any enhancements, a 
violation of the TVPA, § 1591(b)(1)—which requires the use of force, 
fraud, or coercion for victims over fourteen, but not for victims under 
fourteen—carries a base offense level of 34 (ranging from 12 years and 7 
months to 27 years and 3 months), while a violation of § 1591(b)(2)—
which does not require force, fraud, or coercion for minor victims between 
fourteen and eighteen—starts at level 30 (8 years and 1 month to 17 years 
and 6 months).85 The Mann Act provisions for minor victims—§§ 2422(b), 
2423(a)—have a base offense level of 28 (6 years and 6 months to 14 years 
and 7 months).86 Section 2422(a), which applies to adults, carries a base 
offense level of 14 (1 year and 3 months to 3 years and 10 months), but 
increases by 4 levels if the offense involved fraud or coercion.87 Whenever 
a minor victim is involved, these offenses are subject to a 2-level increase 
if a participant knowingly misrepresents his identity to cause or influence, 
or otherwise unduly influences, a victim “to engage in prohibited sexual 
conduct,” or in which the offense involves the use of a computer or 
interactive computer service to facilitate the prohibited sexual conduct.88 
Many traffickers face other enhancements, including a 3- or 4-level 
81 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 provided for the development of guidelines to further the 
basic purposes of criminal punishment: “deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and 
rehabilitation.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.1, pt. A(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015). After calculating the guidelines range, the court must then consider the parties’ policy statements 
for departure from the guidelines, and the § 3553(a) factors, such as “the nature and circumstances of 
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” and “the need for the sentence 
imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense.” § 3553(a). 
82 The judge uses the sentencing guidelines to calculate incarceration terms using a base offense 
level for every offense, then determines whether there are certain aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a). The base offense levels and 
circumstances are expressed as numbers. Id. Once the judge calculates the offense level of the crime, he 
determines the defendant’s criminal history category, then plots the numbers on a chart called the 
sentencing table to find the corresponding guideline range. Id. ch.1, pt. A(1)(4)(h). The higher the 
criminal history category and offense level, the higher the guidelines range. Id.  
83 See Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 57, at 1031. 
84 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A. 
85 Id. § 2G1.3; id. ch. 5, pt. A. 
86 Id. § 2G1.3. The base offense level increases by 8 if the victim was less than twelve years old. Id. 
§ 2G1.3(b)(5).
87 Id.§ 2G1.1(a); id. ch. 5, pt. A.
88 Id. § 2G1.3(b)(2)–(3). 
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enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 for being an organizer, leader, 
manager, or supervisor of a criminal activity that involved five or more 
participants or was otherwise extensive,89 and a 5-level enhancement 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b) for engaging “in a pattern of activity 
involving prohibited sexual conduct.”90 Traffickers also face a higher 
“criminal history category” for each prior term of imprisonment or 
sentence of probation.91 Therefore, the Guidelines’ sentencing ranges for 
sex trafficking convictions often are higher than the statutes’ mandatory 
minimums,92 often even exceeding the offense level ceiling of 43 points, 
which recommends a sentence of life, regardless of the defendant’s 
criminal history category.93  
II. SEX TRAFFICKING VICTIMS
Congress has determined that traffickers should receive such lengthy 
sentences in large part because of the severe harm they inflict on vulnerable 
victims.94 Trafficking victims often share a set of qualities that makes them 
particularly susceptible to traffickers’ recruitment techniques, which 
exploit their vulnerabilities during the grooming process.95 This victim 
selection and grooming process helps explain why victims stay with and 
work for their traffickers. Most trafficking victims are first trafficked 
89 Id. § 3B1.1(b). 
90 Id. § 4B1.5(b); see Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 57, at 1031. 
91 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1. 
92 See Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 57, at 1031. For example, if a bottom was convicted of using 
force, fraud, or coercion to force two fourteen-year-old girls to engage in prostitution, as Keosha Jones 
was, see supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text, she would face a fifteen-year mandatory minimum. 
18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1) (2012). However, her Guideline’s range likely would be even higher. Her base 
offense level would be 34 for violating § 1591(b)(1). U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G1.3. 
If the bottom had previously been imprisoned for more than 60 days for a prior arrest involving drugs—
a common occurrence for women forced to prostitute themselves—and was on parole for a drug charge 
or theft charge when she was arrested for her role as a bottom, her criminal history level would be 4. Id. 
§ 4A1.1. Even if she did not have any other sentencing enhancements, this would make her sentencing
range 15 years and 8 months to 19 years and 7 months, already higher than the mandatory minimum. Id.
ch. 5, pt. A. The prosecutor easily could argue that the bottom played an aggravating role in the offense,
because she acted as a supervisor of the two fourteen-year-old girls, and the trafficker’s stable included
seven girls total, making the enterprise “otherwise extensive.” Id. § 3B1.1(b). The judge then would add
3 points to the base offense level of 34. Id. Based on her offense level of 37 and her criminal history of
4, the bottom would face a sentencing range of 21 years and 10 months to 27 years and 3 months. Id. ch.
5, pt. A. Although post-Booker, the judge is not bound to sentence the bottom within the Guideline’s
range, judges often do not depart significantly downward from the Guideline’s range. See infra note 207
and accompanying text.
93 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1. 
94 See, Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 57, at 1017. 
95 See id. at 1019–20. 
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before they turn eighteen,96 and the average age of entry into prostitution is 
between twelve and fourteen years old.97 Many trafficking victims already 
have been physically or sexually abused,98 come from dysfunctional 
families,99 and are runaways,100 drug users, homeless, or transgender.101 
Youth with such traumatic pasts often are particularly vulnerable due to 
lack of resources, low self-esteem, and weak family ties—particularly, a 
lack of a healthy relationship with an adult male—which leads traffickers 
to target them as easy prey.102   
Traffickers choose vulnerable victims and use grooming techniques to 
coerce their victims into prostituting themselves, then employ a cycle of 
violence to force them to continue doing so. Bottoms begin like every other 
trafficking victim, and the traffickers exploit their vulnerabilities to force 
them not only into prostituting themselves, but also into competing with 
each other for the coveted role of the trafficker’s bottom. Bottoms perform 
many duties for their traffickers, including, but not limited to, recruiting 
other victims, collecting money, training victims, and physically beating 
other victims. Bottoms’ victimization, combined with their acts against 
other victims, make it difficult for both the public and the law to determine 
whether they are victims or perpetrators.  
A. How Traffickers Choose, Groom, and Maintain Their Victims:
Including Bottoms 
A trafficker looks for a vulnerable girl—usually a minor—as his target 
victim, often finding her at a bus station, homeless shelter, mall, school, or 
96 Cheryl Hanna, Somebody’s Daughter: The Domestic Trafficking of Girls for the Commercial Sex 
Industry and the Power of Love, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 12 (2002).  
97 Annitto, supra note 64, at 9.  
98 Studies show that 70% of victims of domestic sex trafficking were sexually abused between age 
three and fourteen. Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 57, at 1020–21 (citing Suzanna L. Tiapula & Allison 
Turkel, Identifying the Victims of Human Trafficking, PROSECUTOR, Apr./May/June 2008, 
https://www.gvsu.edu/cms4/asset/903124DF-BD7F-3286-FE3330AA44F994DE/identifying_
victims(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/K3N3-DXD7]). 
99 Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 57, at 1021 (explaining that trafficking victims’ “family life is rife 
with physical abuse, verbal abuse, neglect, and family abandonment”). 
100 The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children estimated that one in six endangered 
runaways were likely sex trafficking victims in 2014. Child Sexual Exploitation, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN (2015), http://www.missingkids.com/1in6 [https://perma.cc/E57T-
5KAF].  
101 Tamar R. Birckhead, The “Youngest Profession”: Consent, Autonomy, and Prostituted 
Children, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1060–61 (2011). 
102 Id. 
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on the street while prowling in his car.103 The trafficker initially flatters this 
young girl, taking her on dates and feigning love.104 He gives her 
presents—usually small trinkets that mean more to a victim because she 
has never had a man give her anything meaningful—or drugs and alcohol, 
depending on what the trafficker calculates will make his target most 
enamored with and loyal to him.105 The trafficker uses romance to gain the 
victim’s trust, which he then exploits.106  
The trafficker often exploits the fact that the victim has not had a 
stable family or “father figure” in her life, a role which the trafficker often 
fills.107 He isolates his victim so that he becomes the only meaningful 
relationship in her life, and creates a bond with her that substitutes for a 
family relationship.108 To limit her communication with her family or 
friends, the trafficker often takes away the victim’s phone or computer 
access.109 He may give the victim a nickname to distance her from her 
previous identity and make her his “property.”110 Frequently, the trafficker 
has sex with the victim early in the relationship to further bond her to him 
and make her feel loved, and therefore less likely to leave him.111 The 
trafficker only gradually introduces his victim into prostitution so that she 
does not immediately understand that he is victimizing her.112 Often, the 
victim thinks that she must engage in sex acts to retain his love or to 
support him.113 Many different factors, including youth, prior abuse, need 
103 See Brief of Appellee, Sawyer II, supra note 61, at 3 (describing how the trafficker met victims 
on the street while driving and convinced them to get into his car, which he called being out “on the 
prowl”); Annitto, supra note 64, at 13.   
104 See Michael J. Frank & G. Zachary Terwilliger, Gang-Controlled Sex Trafficking, 3 VA. J.
CRIM. L. 342, 376 (2015) (describing the techniques of “Romeo” or “finesse pimps,” only one type of 
pimp in gangs that engage in sex trafficking); Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 57, at 1025.  
105 Frank & Terwilliger, supra note 104, at 377; see, e.g., United States v. Alaboudi, 786 F.3d 
1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 2015) (noting that traffickers provided alcohol, drugs, and cigarettes to fourteen-
year-old victim).  
106 Frank & Terwilliger, supra note 104, at 377. 
107 Id. at 369 (noting that it is not mere happenstance that “traditional” pimps require their victims 
to call them “daddy”).  
108 Id. at 370. 
109 Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 57, at 1025. 
110 Id.; Frank & Terwilliger, supra note 104, at 416–17; see also Brief of Appellee, Sawyer II, 
supra note 61, at 3, 9–12, 14 (noting that the trafficker gave each of his victims new names starting with 
the letter “P,” such as Precious, Paradise, Pooh, and Peaches, because his nickname was “P-Child”). 
111 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 791 F. Supp. 2d 81, 83 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting the underage 
victim’s first sexual partner was her trafficker, beginning on the second day they met); Silvestrini, supra 
note 1 (describing a fifteen-year-old victim who lost her virginity to a trafficker only after he beat and 
threatened her).   
112 See Annitto, supra note 64, at 13–14. 
113 See United States v. Roy, 781 F.3d 416, 418 (8th Cir. 2015) (noting that although the 
trafficker—whom the victim considered her “boyfriend”—“initially treated [the victim] well,” he 
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for attention, and lack of knowledge and experience, contribute to a 
victim’s obliviousness that the trafficker is victimizing and exploiting 
her.114  
Once the trafficker has the victim under his thumb, he can begin to 
exercise his power over her in increasingly degrading, violent ways. In 
addition to giving his victim a new name, a trafficker often refers to her 
with derogatory terms, such as “ho,” “bitch,”115 or “beast,”116 signaling to 
the victim that she has no value—except as the pimp’s property and 
moneymaker.117 A trafficker also imposes a variety of rules on his victim, 
such as requiring her to look down when addressing him, walking behind 
him, obeying his orders, and having sex with him whenever he desires.118 
These rules demonstrate that he owns her; she is merely his chattel.  
Most commonly, a trafficker employs violence or the threat of 
violence to prevent victims from violating his rules or punish them for 
doing so. Traffickers have beaten their victims with fists, belts, hammers, 
pipes,119 shoes,120 and other objects;121 choked them unconscious; and 
kicked, slapped, and thrown them down stairs.122 Traffickers use rape as a 
way to control their victims.123 Traffickers subject their victims to strip 
“eventually told her that if she loved him, she would go make money for him,” then beat her repeatedly 
and threatened to kill her); Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 57, at 1026. 
114 See Annitto, supra note 64, at 14 (citing FRANCES GRAGG ET AL., N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF 
CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., NEW YORK PREVALENCE STUDY OF COMMERCIALLY SEXUALLY 
EXPLOITED CHILDREN: FINAL REPORT 44 (2007), http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/reports/csec-
2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8DC-HBV6]). 
115 See Frank & Terwilliger, supra note 104, at 381. 
116 Brief of Appellee, Sawyer II, supra note 61, at 10 (noting the trafficker called one of his victims 
his “beast” because she made so much money for him).  
117 See Sara Sidner, Branded: The Shocking Life of a Sex-Trafficked Girl, CNN (Sept. 10, 2015, 
9:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/09/us/freedom-project-branding/ [https://perma.cc/74LL-
AWUX] (discussing ways in which traffickers demonstrate their ownership over victims, including 
tattoos of barcodes).  
118 See Brief of Appellee, Sawyer II, supra note 61, at 4 (stating that the pimp did not allow his 
victims to look at or talk to other men, since that would disrespect the pimp, and “the other man might 
be a pimp who could ‘steal’ the victim away from [him]”); Frank & Terwilliger, supra note 104, at 
381–82.  
119 Brief of Appellee, Sawyer II, supra note 61, at 5. 
120 United States v. McIntyre, 612 F. App’x 77, 79 n.3 (3d Cir. 2015). 
121 See, e.g., Government Sentencing Memorandum at 13, Sawyer I, No. 10-CR-744 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
27, 2012) (describing instance in which the trafficker’s victim, who was about six months pregnant with 
his child at the time, tried to leave after a fight, at which point the trafficker “slammed [the victim’s] 
arm in the door and threw a glass ash tray at her head, forcing her to go to the hospital, where staples 
were put in her head”). 
122 Brief of Appellee, Sawyer II, supra note 61, at 5, 13. 
123 Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Sawyer I, supra note 59, at 124; United States v. Alaboudi, 
786 F.3d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 2015). 
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searches when suspicious that they are hiding money.124 Traffickers may 
harm or threaten to harm victims’ family members or children if they step 
out of line.125 Almost as effective as physical violence against victims is 
making them witness violent abuse directed at other victims.126 Traffickers 
often beat victims in the presence of fellow victims to demonstrate power 
and instill fear.127  
The grooming process and subsequent abuse mirrors that of a 
domestic batterer and his victim.128 A batterer employs a cycle of violence, 
which includes a tension-building phase, physical violence, and a 
honeymoon phase in which the batterer promises to end the violence, 
which often causes a victim to forgive him and stay.129 Like battered 
women who stay with their abusers, sex trafficking victims often stay with 
their traffickers, caught in a similar cycle of violence.130 Like a domestic 
batterer in the “honeymoon phase,” a trafficker motivates his victims to 
work more to make him more money by promising incentives such as 
tattoos131 or marriage,132 or that they can have his babies.133 He also may 
promise that if a victim makes enough money, she can supervise other 
124 Brief of Appellee, Sawyer II, supra note 61, at 5. 
125 Evelina Giobbe, An Analysis of Individual, Institutional, and Cultural Pimping, 1 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 33, 48 (1993); SIDDHARTH KARA, SEX TRAFFICKING: INSIDE THE BUSINESS OF MODERN 
SLAVERY 192 (2009) (describing traffickers who routinely threatened children they had fathered with 
their victims when the victims resisted engaging in sex acts).  
126 See Frank & Terwilliger, supra note 104, at 381. 
127 See id.; see also Brief of Appellee, Sawyer II, supra note 61, at 10 (describing when the victim 
witnessed the pimp beat many other victims and witnessed him threaten to shoot and kill another victim 
and explaining she never said no to him because she was too terrified of what he would do to her); 
Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, Evans, supra note 22, at 6 (stating trafficker would “beat the 
daylights” out of his bottom as an example to other victims). 
128 See Annitto, supra note 64, at 14; Melissa Farley, Prostitution, Trafficking, and Cultural 
Amnesia: What We Must Not Know in Order to Keep the Business of Sexual Exploitation Running 
Smoothly, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 109, 125 (2006) (“The traumatic bonds established between 
women in prostitution and their pimp/captors is identical to those between battered women and their 
batterers.”); Giobbe, supra note 125, at 45–46.  
129 Kelly Grace Monacella, Supporting a Defense of Duress: The Admissibility of Battered Woman 
Syndrome, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 699, 705 (1997). 
130 Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Sawyer I, supra note 59, at 145; Annitto, supra note 64, at 15. 
131 Brief of Appellee, Sawyer II, supra note 61, at 4 (explaining that the trafficker would tattoo his 
victims with his name after they proved themselves to him by making him enough money, using the 
tattoo as an incentive to prostitute themselves more and also as a branding mechanism); Sidner, supra 
note 117 (detailing thirteen-year-old victim’s feeling of pride after having trafficker’s nickname 
tattooed on her chest, thinking it meant a “new family”).  
132 Brief of Appellee, Sawyer II, supra note 61, at 14 (noting that the trafficker called victim his 
wife and gave her an engagement ring for her seventeenth birthday, promising that if she made enough 
money, she eventually could be his “bottom bitch” and stop working).  
133 Id. at 10 (noting that the trafficker told his victim that he loved her and that she could have his 
baby).  
111:753 (2017) Stripping Agency 
771 
victims and eventually stop working as a prostitute, becoming the 
trafficker’s bottom.134 
B. Bottoms’ Role in Sex Trafficking
Bottoms are trafficked in the same way as every other trafficking 
victim: they display the same vulnerabilities and are recruited and groomed 
in the same manner, with promises of love and a better life, quickly 
followed by severe abuse and degradation.135 Just as the traffickers exploit 
victims’ vulnerabilities when recruiting them, they also prey upon those 
vulnerabilities to motivate victims to compete with each other to become 
the trafficker’s bottom.136 Traffickers often use the status of bottom to force 
the girls to compete against each other for the trafficker’s affection.137 To 
keep his victims psychologically dependent on him, a trafficker may 
demote and promote different girls to punish or reward them.138  
Traffickers dangle the possibility of being the bottom like a carrot, 
often with additional promises that once a victim becomes the bottom, she 
134 Id. at 7–8. 
135 See RIC CURTIS ET AL., NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 1 COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
OF CHILDREN IN NEW YORK CITY: THE CSEC POPULATION IN NEW YORK CITY: SIZE, 
CHARACTERISTICS, AND NEEDS 48 (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/225083.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8G2N-M2B5] (footnote omitted). One seventeen-year-old victim recounted, “I fell in 
love with this guy and thought he was the one . . . and he called himself a pimp. But he always tell me 
I’m his Bottom Bitch and whatever. He put me on the stroll, out there with black eyes and broken noses. 
I was out there messed up.” Id. It is important to note the distinction between female traffickers or 
pimps and bottoms. Although bottoms engage in all of the elements of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b), or 
2423(a), they do not traffic girls of their own volition. Bottoms themselves are trafficked 
simultaneously while committing trafficking offenses; their traffickers’ abuse and power over them 
causes them to commit the offenses. Conversely, some female pimps have their own domestic sex 
trafficking careers. In a DePaul College of Law study of twenty-five former pimps in Chicago, over 
25% of the pimps interviewed were women. Most of them engaged in commercial sex before 
trafficking others, and some even began their trafficking careers as trafficking victims; however, these 
women no longer were trafficked by someone else, even if some still engaged in commercial sex 
themselves. They therefore are not bottoms and could not benefit from this Note’s proposed defenses or 
statutory safety valve. JODY RAPHAEL & BRENDA MYERS-POWELL, SCHILLER DUCANTO & FLECK 
FAMILY LAW CTR. OF DEPAUL UNIV. COLL. OF LAW, FROM VICTIMS TO VICTIMIZERS: INTERVIEWS 
WITH 25 EX-PIMPS IN CHICAGO 1 (2010), http://www.turnofftheredlight.ie/wp-content/uploads/
2011/02/PIMPING-FAMILY_LAW_CENTER_REPORT-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/D32Y-Y5GZ]. 
136 See Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 57, at 1028.  
137 Id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Glen Burnie Man Indicted for Sex Trafficking of a 
Minor (Sept. 21, 2010). https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/md/news/archive/GlenBurnie
ManIndictedforSexTraffickingofaMinor.html [https://perma.cc/Z3N3-7CPB] (noting trafficker enticed 
girls to work for him by promising they could be his bottom). 
138 See Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 57, at 1028. Susan Karaskiewicz, a defense attorney in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin who has represented multiple bottom girls, noted that the bottom changes often 
in a typical trafficking situation, making it a game of chance for which girl will be considered the 
bottom when the government arrests the actors in the sex trafficking ring. Interview with Susan 
Karaskiewicz, Criminal Def. Attorney, in Milwaukee, Wis. (Mar. 11, 2016). 
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can stop working as a prostitute.139 This promise rarely comes true. Due to 
such promises, and a desire to please their pimps with whom they are in 
love,140 victims covet being the bottom. The bottom is the pimp’s most 
trusted prostitute, who may have achieved her status by earning the most 
money141 or working for the pimp the longest.142 While a bottom’s duties 
vary depending on her trafficker, many of the common duties are 
punishable under §§ 1591, 2422(b), or 2423(a): recruiting more victims, 
collecting money from other victims, creating and posting internet 
advertisements, training new victims, transporting victims (often across 
state lines), supervising other victims, and occasionally punishing other 
victims.143 
Many bottoms participate in recruiting other victims for their 
traffickers. Despite their promises to the contrary, most traffickers still 
require bottoms to engage in commercial sex themselves. Because many 
traffickers set quotas for their victims as a collective,144 it is logical but 
naïve for victims, including bottoms, to seek more victims for their stable 
in the hope that the trafficker will allow each victim to engage in fewer sex 
acts.  
C. Complications of Bottoms Being Victims and Perpetrators
The understanding that most women who have engaged in prostitution 
as a result of having been trafficked are victims, which was explicitly 
recognized in the TVPA, is gaining traction in state governments and with 
the public.145 After Congress enacted the TVPA in 2000, several states 
139 See Brief of Appellee, Sawyer II, supra note 61, at 10, 14 (detailing how the defendant told one 
fifteen-year-old victim that he loved her, she would be his “bottom bitch” and could have his baby, and 
how he told another seventeen-year-old prostitute that if she made him enough money, she could 
become his “bottom bitch” and stop working). 
140 Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Sawyer I, supra note 59, at 109, 122–23; Silvestrini, supra note 
1 (recounting that a bottom told her trafficker she loved him).  
141 United States v. Daniels, 685 F.3d 1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 2012). 
142 United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pipkins, 
378 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2004). 
143 See Frank & Terwilliger, supra note 104, at 399 n.210. 
144 See United States v. Hornbuckle, 784 F.3d 549, 551 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that traffickers 
imposed daily quotas on their victims); United States v. Maes, No. 1:05-CR-443-2, 2009 WL 5064621, 
at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2009) (noting that traffickers beat victims if they did not meet their quota for 
the night); see also Cheryl Nelson Butler, Bridge over Troubled Water: Safe Harbor Laws for Sexually 
Exploited Minors, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1281, 1294 (2015) (discussing quotas traffickers impose on their 
victims). 
145 See, e.g., Eleanor Goldberg, Sex Trafficking Victims Usually Can’t Escape Prostitution 
Charges. This Lawyer’s Working to Change That, HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/18/sex-trafficking-prostitution-charges_n_7119474.html 
[https://perma.cc/6SXE-UHYE]; Batya Ungar-Sargon, Sex Trafficking Victims, Not ‘Prostitutes,’ 
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passed laws that allow trafficking survivors to vacate prior convictions for 
prostitution if the acts were committed as a result of trafficking.146 State 
legislatures enacted these laws because they recognized that trafficking 
victims were presumably not criminally responsible for their actions.147 
Nonetheless, the presumption that a trafficking victim is not criminally 
responsible disappears when that victim performs acts that traffic other 
victims.148 On one hand, this makes sense; a bottom who furthers the 
trafficking of another person hurts another vulnerable youth. When one 
examines in isolation the acts of recruitment, management, and violence 
that a bottom commits against other victims, it may be easy to advocate 
prosecuting her to the fullest extent of the law.149 On the other hand, it is 
imperative that law enforcement and the courts not view bottoms’ offenses 
in isolation. Bottoms are victims of their traffickers; their traffickers used 
the same recruitment and grooming techniques on the bottoms as on their 
other victims.  
Traffickers almost always continue to force bottoms to engage in 
prostitution, and continue to physically and verbally assault them.150 The 
traffickers’ physical abuse and complete domination strip away the 
bottoms’ agency: although bottoms commit offenses against other victims, 
they do so either at the command of or for the sake of the man trafficking 
the bottom and the other victims. A trafficker often forces his victims to 
Finally Getting Help (and a New Name) in Court, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 12, 2015, 4:50 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/12/sex-trafficking-victims-not-prostitutes-finally-
getting-help-and-a-new-name-in-court.html [https://perma.cc/Q7N7-H366]; Jacob Wheeler, Are 
Prostitutes Lawbreakers or Trafficking Victims?, BRIDGE MAG. (June 9, 2016), 
http://bridgemi.com/2016/06/are-prostitutes-lawbreakers-or-trafficking-victims/ [https://perma.cc/
6HW9-VRSU]. 
146 New York was the first state to create such a mechanism; the New York legislature sought to 
“remove a blot on the character of such victims so as to help those presumably not criminally 
responsible for the offense to gain useful employment and rebuild their lives.” Kate Mogulescu, The 
Public Defender as Anti-Trafficking Advocate, an Unlikely Role: How Current New York City Arrest 
and Prosecution Policies Systematically Criminalize Victims of Sex Trafficking, 15 CUNY L. REV. 471, 
476 (2012). Subsequently, other states have followed suit with similar statutes. See, e.g., 725 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-2.1 (2016); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 8-302 (West 2011); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 176.515 (2015). 
147 See Mogulescu, supra note 146, at 476. 
148 See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, Evans, supra note 22, at 6–7 (government 
acknowledging that bottom was the “chief victim” although it had prosecuted her under § 1591).  
149 See supra Section II.B.  
150 See United States v. McIntyre, 612 F. App’x 77, 79 (3d Cir. 2015); Brief of Appellee, Sawyer 
II, supra note 61, at 10, 14–15. 
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compete with each other151 or beat each other, which provokes animosity 
and contributes to the culture of fear.152  
The Ninth Circuit has held that an expert’s testimony about the role of 
a bottom may have “helped the jury evaluate [the bottom’s] testimony that 
she was acting at [her trafficker’s] direction, not on her own accord.”153 In 
other cases, experts have testified that traffickers exert “total control” over 
their victims and can force them to victimize other victims at their behest.154 
When subject to such total control, trafficking victims, including bottoms, 
are not exercising agency to freely decide to engage in trafficking offenses 
against other victims, but are acting out of a need to protect themselves and 
please their trafficker.  
Public perception has begun to shift from condemnation to 
compassion and is beginning to consider prostitutes—in particular 
underage prostitutes—as victims rather than criminals.155 Many scholarly 
articles have proposed legal solutions for dealing with prostitutes and 
trafficking victims;156 nevertheless, most have ignored the problem raised 
when a victim—still victimized and controlled by her trafficker—
perpetrates trafficking offenses against other trafficking victims.157 
Although bottoms perform different roles for different traffickers, 
many participate in the recruitment of new victims158 and management of 
other prostitutes159—thereby meeting § 1591(a)(1)’s element of recruiting 
151 See People v. McFarland, No. B171999, 2005 WL 713815, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2005). 
152 See Parker & Skrmetti, supra note 57, at 1028, 1035; Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Sawyer I, 
supra note 59, at 136 (noting that when a trafficker forces one victim to beat up another, all victims 
develop a sense of distrust of each other, and therefore are less likely to conspire to escape together).  
153 United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010). 
154 Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Sawyer I, supra note 59, at 135–36. 
155 See supra note 145. 
156 See, e.g., Annitto, supra note 64, at 59, 62, 65 (advocating for increased judicial understanding 
about exploited youth, statutory provisions preventing the prosecution of underage prostitutes, and 
increased funding for therapeutic services for victims); Alyssa M. Barnard, Note, “The Second Chance 
They Deserve”: Vacating Convictions of Sex Trafficking Victims, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1493–
1500 (2014) (proposing amendments to state vacatur statutes to make it easier for victims to avoid 
criminal convictions and vacate existing ones); Carly Elizabeth Souther, Victims Not Vixens: 
Prostituted Children and the Case for Preemption, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 381, 384 (2014) 
(arguing for federal preemption of state laws that criminalize underage prostitutes). 
157 Fernandez, supra note 65 (addressing the possibility of the necessity for bringing criminal 
charges against an underage “bottom” who recruits other trafficking victims and advocating for 
prosecutorial discretion and a need for recognition of the fact that the bottom is also a victim). 
However, the author does not give specific solutions to the problem. 
158 Brief of Appellee at 21, United States v. McIntyre, 612 F. App’x 77 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-
3691); Silvestrini, supra note 1. 
159 United States v. Fuertes, 435 F. App’x 802, 805 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Lewis, 791 F. 
Supp. 2d 81, 83 (D.D.C. 2011); Report and Recommendation, United States v. Wilson, No. 10-cr-
60102, 2010 WL 2609429, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2010), adopted, No. 10-cr-60102, 2010 WL 
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or maintaining a person. Because the majority of victims are minors, the 
government would not need to prove that the bottom did so using force, 
fraud, or coercion.160 Ironically, the element rarely at issue when 
prosecuting a trafficker could be difficult for the government to prove 
against his bottom: that she benefitted financially or received something of 
value from causing another person to engage in a commercial sex act.161 
However, even if the trafficker does not allow a bottom to keep her own 
proceeds or those of the victims that she helps recruit or maintain, courts 
have held a “thing of value” to include sex acts and items such as 
photographs and videos.162 Any additional benefits a bottom receives from 
her trafficker as a result of her duties as a bottom, such as additional nail 
appointments or jewelry, also could be considered a “thing of value” for 
purposes of § 1591. Many bottoms, in their recruitment or managerial 
duties, also participate in enticing victims to travel or transporting victims 
across state lines—thereby satisfying those elements of §§ 2422 and 
2423.163 Therefore, most bottoms satisfy the elements of the federal sex 
trafficking statutes; however, bottoms perpetrate these offenses not of their 
own volition, but because of their own victimization. The question of their 
criminal responsibility becomes fraught, as bottoms take on the role of both 
victim and perpetrator.  
III. PROSECUTION OF BOTTOMS WHO VIOLATE
THE SEX TRAFFICKING STATUTES 
As the law stands today, prosecutors may use their discretion to 
charge bottoms with violating §§ 1591, 2422(b), and 2423(a), which has 
the dual effect of granting prosecutors tremendous leverage to make 
2612341 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2010) (noting that each bottom controlled the day-to-day activities of the 
prostitutes that worked for each pimp).  
160 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2012); DUREN BANKS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHARACTERISTICS OF SUSPECTED HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
INCIDENTS, 2008–2010, at 8 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cshti0810.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H2SV-UAFG] (stating that 64% of confirmed sex trafficking cases involved 
allegations of prostitution or sexual exploitation of a child).  
161 § 1591(a)(2); see, e.g., Brief of Appellee at 21–22, McIntyre, 612 F. App’x 77 (No. 14-3691) 
(describing how the bottom was required to give all proceeds from a victim she had recruited to her 
trafficker, as well as her own profits, and was beat with a shoe when she did not). 
162 See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 782 F.3d 983, 990 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that sexual acts, 
photographs, and videos constitute “things of value,” and that acquiring those items through 
participation in a commercial sex trafficking venture could result in criminal culpability).  
163 See, e.g., Indictment at 2–3, United States v. Wiggins, No. 3:11-cr-02420 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 
2011) (charging bottoms with violating § 2422(a)); United States v. Scott, 529 F.3d 1290, 1303 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (holding that because the bottom assisted in convincing the underage victim to get into a 
vehicle, she was “criminally responsible” for the same offense as the pimp and could have been 
convicted under § 2423(a)). 
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bottoms cooperate in exchange for a lesser sentence and cabining the 
judge’s sentencing discretion for bottoms who do go to trial, due to the 
mandatory minimum sentences.164 Not many published cases exist in which 
a bottom has appealed; this is most likely because either bottoms cannot be 
identified165 or, more often, because they pleaded guilty to lesser charges 
and testified for the government as part of the plea deal.166  
Some federal prosecutors view all victims of trafficking—including 
bottoms—as victims. These prosecutors can exercise their discretion to not 
charge bottoms with any crimes, or to charge bottoms who commit 
trafficking offenses under less harsh statutes, such as § 1591(c), that do not 
carry mandatory minimums.167 
However, as demonstrated below, not every prosecutor in every 
district declines to charge bottoms or opts to charge them with lesser 
offenses without mandatory minimums.168 This inconsistency suggests the 
need for a statutory mechanism that recognizes bottoms’ role as victims 
within the victim–perpetrator spectrum and codifies it in the law.169 This 
164 Interview with Joseph Bugni, Supervisory Assoc. Fed. Def., Fed. Def. Servs. of Wis., Inc. (Mar. 
16, 2016). 
165 See, e.g., Scott, 529 F.3d at 1294 n.1 (noting that law enforcement could not identify the 
bottom).  
166 The practice of charge bargaining occurs often in sex trafficking cases. Interview with Joseph 
Bugni, supra note 164. In charge bargaining, the prosecution and defense agree that the defendant will 
plead guilty to a lesser charge than what the evidence supports. Id.; see, e.g., Criminal Complaint at 2, 
United States v. Saxton, No. 2:13-cr-00037 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 7, 2012) (charging bottom with two counts 
of sex trafficking of a child and one count of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a child); Plea 
Agreement, United States v. Saxton, No. 2:13-cr-00037 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 7, 2013) (documenting that the 
bottom pleaded guilty to one count of interstate travel in aid of a prostitution enterprise); see also Philip 
Oliss, Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sentencing 
Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1855 (1995). 
167 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 791 F. Supp. 2d 81, 82–83 (D.D.C. 2011) (considering the 
trafficker’s underage bottom to be one of his victims and noting that she was not charged with anything, 
even though she explained rules and collected money from other girls); Amanda Walker-Rodriguez & 
Rodney Hill, Human Sex Trafficking, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (March 2011), 
https://leb.fbi.gov/2011/march/human-sex-trafficking [https://perma.cc/7QCT-HXAK] (noting that a 
bottom is a “victim herself”). Although some may worry that not charging bottoms for the crimes they 
commit against other victims is contrary to the principles of criminal punishment, such as just 
retribution, incapacitation, or deterrence, it should be noted that bottoms are punished during their 
experience as a trafficking victim far worse than the criminal justice system could punish them—
experiencing verbal abuse, severe physical abuse, and being compelled to participate in sex work. U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
168 See infra Section III.B for examples of cases in which prosecutors charged bottoms with 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1591. 
169 Depending on the district in which a bottom is charged, she may face lesser charges and receive 
a minimal prison sentence or probation. See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Campbell, No. 1:10-cr-
00026 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2010); Judgment in a Criminal Case, Campbell, No. 1:10-cr-00026 (N.D. Ill. 
May 11, 2012) (charging the bottom with two counts of harboring illegal aliens for commercial 
advantage, who pleaded guilty to both counts and received a sentence of three years’ probation). In 
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Part outlines the government’s practice of leveraging charges carrying 
mandatory minimums in exchange for bottoms’ cooperation and the 
resulting coercion that further strips bottoms’ agency. It then examines 
courts’ lack of discretion in sentencing bottoms due to the ten- and fifteen-
year mandatory minimums, sentencing guidelines, and sentencing 
enhancements.  
A. Mandatory Minimums as Leverage to
Compel Pleas and Cooperation
Justice Kennedy noted in Missouri v. Frye that the United States has 
“for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”170 More than 
97% of federal convictions are the result of guilty pleas.171 The enactment 
of the federal Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences 
caused a precipitous decline in criminal trials.172 Critics claim that 
prosecutors use mandatory minimum sentences to “pressure defendants, 
who otherwise might test the state’s evidence, into accepting guilty 
pleas.”173 In the majority of reported cases, bottoms fit this mold: they 
commit crimes for which they could be prosecuted under §§ 1591, 2422(b), 
or 2423(a), all of which carry mandatory minimums, but they accept plea 
deals in which they plead guilty (often to lesser charges), testify for the 
government, and receive lower sentences.174 Because victim testimony is 
other districts, a bottom may be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law and face the substantial 
mandatory minimums. See, e.g., Criminal Complaint at 2, Saxton, No. 2:13-cr-00037 (charging the 
bottom with two counts of 18 U.S.C. § 1591). This is the type of inconsistent treatment that Congress 
sought to address through the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 1.  
170 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012)). 
171 MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 2011 STATISTICAL TABLES, tbls.4.2 & 5.22.2009 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fjs11st.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DCP-5RAH]. 
172 See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 
117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1453–54 (2008) (citing Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of 
Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005)). Before Congress adopted the 
guidelines, more than 12% of federal criminal offenders were convicted at trial, but by 1996, that 
number had dropped to approximately 8%, and since 2000 has remained below 5%. Id.  
173 Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of 
Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 61, 78 (1993); see also Robert G. Morvillo & Barry 
A. Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial Power in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 137, 137 (1995) (arguing that the guidelines give prosecutors “greater leverage to
virtually compel plea bargaining, force cooperation, and in essence determine the length of sentences”). 
174 See, e.g., Criminal Complaint at 2, Saxton, No. 2:13-cr-00037 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 7, 2012); Plea 
Agreement at 1, 7, Saxton, No. 2:13-cr-00037 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 7, 2013) (documenting that the bottom 
was charged with 18 U.S.C. § 1591 and pleaded guilty to a lesser charge on the condition she would 
testify for the government if necessary); United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 399, 404–05 (6th Cir. 2011); 
Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Daniels, No. 2:08-cr-20213 (E.D. Mich. July 10, 2008) 
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essential to proving the elements of trafficking offenses under § 1591,175 
prosecutors may use whatever leverage they have over victims to make 
them testify against their traffickers176—in the case of bottoms, by 
threatening them with charges that carry mandatory minimums.  
Although using this leverage may result in convicting more 
traffickers, it also squeezes bottoms between a rock and a hard place: either 
they cooperate with the government and testify or face the same charges as 
the men who trafficked them—charges that carry ten- or fifteen-year 
mandatory minimums. This is not a genuine choice, so the government 
could be viewed as having replaced the bottom’s trafficker in coercing her 
to engage in potentially traumatic activity.177 When looking at the big 
picture of who should be behind bars and the easiest way to put them there, 
it is understandable that the government would use this leverage to pressure 
bottoms to testify against their traffickers.  
For instance, in United States v. Campbell,178 the government charged 
the trafficker’s bottom, Danielle John, as a codefendant with her trafficker. 
John originally pleaded not guilty; however, she withdrew that plea 
pursuant to a plea agreement and testified for the government.179 The jury 
heard negative things about John’s role in the sex trafficking operation, 
including her forcing noncitizen victims to continue working as sex 
workers in the “spa” by confiscating their identification documents so that 
the trafficker could threaten them with deportation.180 She also trained other 
(describing a bottom who acted in concert with the trafficker to transport a minor victim for the 
purposes of prostitution who was charged with eight counts of child pornography and adult and child 
prostitution, leading to her pleading guilty to distribution of child pornography, testifying against the 
trafficker and receiving a sentence of ten years in prison); United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186, 1192 
(9th Cir. 2010) (noting the bottom was charged with § 1591(a) before pleading guilty, testifying on 
behalf of the government, and receiving a reduced sentence).  
175 See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text. 
176 See Barnard, supra note 156, at 1471 (noting the possibility that some women are prosecuted 
for the sole crime of being a trafficking victim, in order to convince them to provide information about 
their trafficker in exchange for reduced or dropped charges). 
177 See Geneva O. Brown, Little Girl Lost: Las Vegas Metro Police Vice Division and the Use of 
Material Witness Holds Against Teenaged Prostitutes, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 471, 501 (2008) (detailing 
the secondary victimization trafficking victims endure when coerced into cooperation).  
178 770 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2014). 
179 Minute Entry, United States v. Campbell, No. 1:10-cr-00026 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2010) (pleading 
not guilty); Minute Entry, Campbell, No. 1:10-cr-00026 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2010) (pleading guilty); 
Annie Sweeney, Convicted Pimp Sentenced to Life in Prison, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 26, 2012), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-11-26/news/ct-met-human-trafficking-sentence-20121127_
1_massage-parlors-life-sentence-illegal-immigrants [https://perma.cc/2B65-JG8B]. 
180 Campbell, 770 F.3d at 562, 565. Every act John committed against the other victims, she 
committed at her trafficker’s direction; John’s trafficker would beat her severely if she did not obey his 
orders. Government Sentencing Memorandum at 5–6, Campbell, No. 1:10-cr-00026 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 
2012). 
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victims, enforced the trafficker’s rules, collected the victims’ money, beat 
the other victims or restrained them so the trafficker could beat them, and 
helped the trafficker frighten the victims into thinking he had killed a 
victim who complained to the police by lining a basement with plastic so 
he could “dismember a dead body.”181 But the jury also heard evidence of 
the trafficker’s abuse of John—he beat her when she broke his rules, 
tattooed her with a large scroll bearing his “manifesto,” which asserted that 
she “live[s] for” the trafficker “till death.”182 Despite her substantial role in 
the sex trafficking operation, as part of her plea agreement, John pleaded 
guilty to harboring undocumented immigrants for commercial advantage,183 
and the government recommended that she receive probation; the 
government reasoned that John did not deserve further punishment through 
incarceration given her trafficker’s treatment of her and given her 
cooperation in the case.184  
The competing interests between forcing bottoms to testify to ensure 
that their trafficker is convicted, and trying to preserve what little agency 
bottoms have left after being trafficked create a tension that cannot be 
easily reconciled. Leveraging the threat of charges that carry mandatory 
minimums may be an effective way to secure bottoms’ testimony, and in 
some cases, such as John’s, will result in conviction of the trafficker and a 
better life for the bottom.185 However, when prosecutors are able to use this 
potent threat over bottoms in exchange for their testimony, they are 
181 Brief of Appellee at 14, Campbell, 770 F.3d 556 (No. 12-3724); Campbell, 770 F.3d at 564–65.  
182 Brief of Appellee at 14, Campbell, 770 F.3d 556 (No. 12-3724); Campbell, 770 F.3d at 565.  
183 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II) (2012); Judgment in a Criminal Case, Campbell, No. 1:10-cr-
00026 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012). John was never formally charged with a trafficking-related offense; 
although she was arrested pursuant to a criminal complaint that charged her with conspiracy to commit 
extortion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1592. The indictment charged her with harboring offenses 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II), and 1324(a)(1)(B)(i). Criminal 
Complaint at 1, Campbell, No. 1:10-cr-00026 (N.D. Ill. Jan, 12, 2010); Indictment at 4, 6, Campbell, 
No. 1:10-cr-00026 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2010). 
184 Diane MacArthur, Assistant U.S. Att’y, N. Dist. of Ill., Presentation to Human Trafficking 
Class at Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law (Oct. 29, 2015); Government Sentencing 
Memorandum at 6, Campbell, No. 1:10-cr-00026 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2012) (noting that “John began to 
cooperate with the government shortly after her January 2010 arrest”); Judgment in a Criminal Case, 
Campbell, No. 1:10-cr-00026 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012). John was recently finishing her college degree 
and created an organization called “The Next Step ND” to help others coming out of the life of 
trafficking. Kevin Wallevand, Sex Trafficking Survivor, Unveils New Organization to Help Those 
Coming Out of the Life, Speaking at NDSU Tuesday, ABC WDAY 6 (Jan. 25, 2016), 
http://www.wday.com/news/3932742-sex-trafficking-survivor-unveils-new-organization-help-those-
coming-out-life-speaking [https://perma.cc/MH8C-E69V].  
185 Silvestrini, supra note 1 (describing a case in which a bottom who pleaded guilty, cooperated 
with the government against her trafficker, got a job, began working toward obtaining her GED, and 
then, after sentencing, thanked the prosecutor and hugged the FBI agent who arrested her, telling him, 
“[y]ou’re the lifesaver”). 
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exerting pressure that is, in the eyes of the bottom, not so different than that 
exerted by her trafficker. Testifying in open court against their traffickers 
may be extremely traumatic for bottoms, inhibiting their recovery or 
causing them to fear for the lives of their families.186 The government 
further strips the bottoms’ agency by threatening to charge them with 
statutes that carry high mandatory minimums; as a practical matter, this 
practice forces bottoms into pleading guilty to lesser charges and testifying 
for the government.187  
B. Prosecutorial Discretion Replaces Judicial Discretion When Charging
Bottoms with Statutes Carrying Mandatory Minimums 
Sometimes the mere threat of charging a bottom with violating the 
substantive sex trafficking statutes fails to compel the bottom’s 
cooperation: there are many cases in which the government charged 
bottoms with violating § 1591 and the bottoms do not plead guilty 
immediately or, in rare cases, ever.188 In United States v. Wilson, the 
government charged two traffickers and their respective bottoms with 
violating § 1591.189 The court noted that the bottoms controlled the victims’ 
everyday activity, but did not give further details about their activities.190 
However, there are recordings of conversations between one of the 
incarcerated traffickers and his bottom, during which he was “giving 
directives” to her, including directions to post prostitution advertisements 
186 See ALISON SISKIN & LIANA SUN WYLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34317, TRAFFICKING IN 
PERSONS: U.S. POLICY AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 30 (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/row/RL34317.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE7D-4JNE] (noting that victims “may refuse to testify 
because of fear of retribution against themselves or their families”); Zraick, supra note 8 (noting that 
“[v]ictims, particularly minors, are often fearful of speaking out against their pimps,” needing services 
and counseling to recover and to overcome the fear). 
187 Because of the strong interest in prosecuting and convicting bottoms’ traffickers, this Note does 
not advocate making bottoms immune from cooperating with the government, but rather proposes a 
solution to mitigate the government’s power to force bottoms into testifying at trial. See infra Section 
IV.A.
188 See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186, 1192 (9th Cir. 2010); Criminal Complaint at
1, United States v. Jones, No. 8:13-cr-00442 (M.D. Fla. July 15, 2013); Criminal Complaint at 2–3, 
United States v. Moore, No. 2:13-mj-00462 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 23, 2013); Plea Agreement for Defendant 
Kimberly Alberti, United States v. Bell, No. 5:12-cr-00057 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2013); Criminal 
Complaint at 2, United States v. Saxton, No. 2:13-cr-00037 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 7, 2012); Criminal 
Complaint, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 8:11-mj-01469 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2011); Indictment at 1–
2, United States v. Avery, No. 2:09-cr-196 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2009); Plea Agreement, United States v. 
Gates, No. 1:04-cr-00205 (D.D.C. May 14, 2004). 
189 Report and Recommendation at 2–4, United States v. Wilson, No. 10-cr-60102, 2010 WL 
2609429 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2010), adopted, No. 10-cr-60102, 2010 WL 2612341 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 
2010).  
190 Id. at 3–4. 
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and an order to collect money from the other victims.191 This conversation 
may be interpreted as further proof that the bottom caused other victims to 
engage in commercial sex acts and financially benefitted from those acts 
while not under the direct control of her trafficker, thus warranting a charge 
of § 1591. Nonetheless, psychologists note that even though a bottom’s 
trafficker may not be physically present, his influence and control over her 
remains just as strong,192 causing the bottom to act on his behalf and under 
his directive, a phenomenon likely attributable to her conditioning and 
trauma bonding.193  
It is possible that even with an understanding of the bottom–trafficker 
relationship, a jury or judge would still conclude that the bottom acted with 
agency and satisfied the elements of § 1591, and therefore should be held 
fully or partially accountable for her actions. Even if a judge determines 
during sentencing that the bottom’s offenses do not warrant a term of 
fifteen years in prison, the judge would be powerless to consider the 
bottom’s lack of agency and depart from the statute’s mandatory minimum 
if the jury convicts her.194  
One avenue currently exists for judges to depart from the mandatory 
minimums. Under § 3553(e), if the government makes a motion, “the court 
shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by 
statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial 
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has 
committed an offense.”195 But this exception is only of use to bottoms if 
they plead guilty and cooperate with the government.196 As noted above, 
most prosecutors offer bottoms plea deals that require them to testify 
against their traffickers in exchange for a lesser charge without a 
191 Id. at 5–6. 
192 Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Sawyer I, supra note 59, at 129 (discussing the fear traffickers 
condition victims to feel, which causes them to remain with their traffickers and follow their directions).  
193 See also Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, Evans, supra note 22, at 13–16. The defense 
attorney stated that the government targeted the bottom because she failed to appear for the grand jury, 
which she could not do because her trafficker would not allow it. Id. The bottom told the court that the 
only choice she felt she had was either to leave her children behind, putting them in danger, or “roll 
with the punches” and continue working for her trafficker. Id.  
194 Keep in mind that while the Sentencing Guidelines are merely advisory, statutory minimum 
sentences are mandatory.  
195 The corresponding Sentencing Guideline is § 5K1.1. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5K1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). However, even when a defendant provides substantial
assistance, the government has “a power, not a duty, to file a [substantial assistance] motion.” Wade v.
United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992). 
196 See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Jones, No. 8:13-cr-00442 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 
2013). The bottom was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 but pleaded guilty to a count of conspiracy set 
forth in the information filed on September 10, 2013. Id. The prosecutor filed a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 
motion for substantial assistance before sentencing. Id. 
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mandatory minimum.197 Bottoms who choose not to charge bargain and 
instead go to trial may do so for various reasons: continued loyalty to their 
traffickers and resulting unwillingness to turn and testify against them; fear 
of their traffickers and resulting unwillingness to testify against them; 
ingrained mistrust of law enforcement and unwillingness to make a deal; or 
hope that weak evidence and a favorable jury will result in an acquittal. 
Thus, bottoms who choose to fight their charges almost certainly are not 
providing substantial assistance to the government. If they had provided 
such assistance, then they likely would not be defendants at trial, as the 
government either would have dropped the charges against them, or 
worked out a plea deal with lesser charges.198 Therefore, it is highly 
unlikely that the government would make a motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 
for the judge to depart downward from the mandatory minimum sentence if 
a bottom goes to trial and is convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 
2422(b), or 2423(a). 
Beyond simply facing mandatory minimum sentences, if a bottom is 
convicted under §§ 1591, 2422(b), or 2423(a), the prosecutor likely will 
argue that the judge should apply the sentencing enhancement under 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 for her aggravating role as an organizer, leader, manager, 
or supervisor or the criminal activity. As noted above, traffickers are often 
subject to many sentencing enhancements.199 Bottoms also likely have a 
high criminal history category due to serving time in prison on multiple 
occasions or for committing the instant offense while on probation.200 Many 
women engaging in prostitution are in and out of jail, as they are the target 
of police attention and often not recognized as trafficking victims.201 
Because traffickers force bottoms to engage in commercial sex acts 
themselves, bottoms face considerable risk of having a high criminal 
history score resulting from each prior term of imprisonment due to 
197 See supra Section III.A. 
198 See, e.g., Criminal Complaint at 2, United States v. Saxton, No. 2:13-cr-00037 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 
7, 2013) (charging the bottom with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1591); Plea Agreement at 1, 7, 
Saxton, No. 2:13-cr-00037 (the bottom pleaded guilty to a lesser charge and agreed to cooperate with 
the government); Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Campbell, No. 1:10-cr-00026 (N.D. Ill. 
May 11, 2012) (documenting that the bottom pleaded guilty to a lesser charge and received a sentence 
of probation, with prosecutors’ recommendation).  
199 See supra Section I.D for a discussion of common sentencing enhancements.  
200 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1. Prostitution is only counted if “the sentence 
was a term of probation of more than one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days” or if 
“the prior offense was similar to an instant offense.” § 4A1.2(c)(1). Although it is possible that bottoms 
may not have been imprisoned for thirty days or had a probation sentence of over one year, the 
government likely could argue that the prior prostitution offense was “similar to [the] instant offense” 
of forcing or coercing another into engaging in prostitution. Id.  
201 See Barnard, supra note 156, at 1471 (discussing the frequency of prostitutes’ convictions). 
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prostitution or related activity,202 as well as at risk of receiving the 5-level 
enhancement from U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b) because of their “prohibited sexual 
conduct.”   
Although many states have created a safety valve for prostitution 
offenses committed as a result of trafficking,203 those are state safety valves 
that a federal court may not consider when imposing a sentence on a 
bottom who has been found guilty of trafficking. U.S. Department of 
Justice policy directs prosecutors to file sentence enhancements whenever 
possible, unless they would be inappropriate for prosecutorial 
management;204 such enhancements would lead to a higher Guidelines 
sentencing range due to the nature of a bottom’s profession and likely 
history with law enforcement.205  
Despite judges’ discretion to accept or reject Guidelines sentences 
post-Booker,206 when multiple enhancements have been added to a sentence 
that carries a mandatory minimum, the judge is unlikely to depart 
significantly downward from the Guidelines recommendation to the 
mandatory minimum for multiple reasons, including judges’ respect for the 
separation of powers and Congress’s role in creating the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission; the desire to avoid judicial activism; the goal of maintaining 
uniformity among judges; social pressure to conform among judges; and a 
reluctance to be overturned on appeal.207 Therefore, Congress should create 
a statutory amendment to allow judges to consider the totality of the 
202 Id. 
203 See Michelle Madden Dempsey, Decriminalizing Victims of Sex Trafficking, 52 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 207, 223–24 (2015) (discussing the shortcomings of current safe harbor laws); Mogulescu, supra 
note 146.  
204 Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Shadow of Advisory Guidelines and 
Mandatory Minimums, 19 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 377, 385 n.52 (2010) (citing U. S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.300 (1997), https://www.justice.gov/usam/united-states-
attorneys-manual [https://perma.cc/NPB2-BJV3] (“Such a reason [for not filing an enhancement] might 
include, for example, that the United States Attorney’s office is particularly overburdened, the case 
would be time-consuming to try, and proceeding to trial would significantly reduce the total number of 
cases disposed of by the office.”). 
205 See supra Section I.D. 
206 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258 (2005) (striking part of Federal Sentencing Act that 
made the Guidelines mandatory).  
207 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.1 pt. A(1)(4)(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) 
(noting that downward departures should be applied only to “atypical” cases that fall outside the 
“heartland” of cases). The Guidelines warn that appellate courts are likely to find sentences outside the 
Guidelines’ ranges “unreasonable.” Id. The Guidelines send a mixed message, however, also stating 
that departures “perform an integral function in the sentencing guideline system” because “it is difficult 
to prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially 
relevant to a sentencing decision.” Id. § 5K2.0 cmt. background; see also Ricardo J. Bascuas, The 
American Inquisition: Sentencing After the Federal Guidelines, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 37 (2010) 
(discussing reasons judges sentence within the Guidelines post-Booker).   
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circumstances to provide a fair and just sentence for bottoms convicted of 
trafficking offenses at trial.208 
IV. STATUTORY SAFETY VALVE FOR BOTTOMS PROSECUTED UNDER
18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(B), AND 2423(A) 
Congress has stated that the purpose of mandatory minimum 
sentences is to provide a strong deterrent, just punishment, and uniformity 
for perpetrators of certain crimes.209 However, because bottoms commit 
offenses as a result of force, fraud, or coercion exerted upon them by their 
traffickers and not as a result of their own agency, forcing judges to impose 
mandatory minimums on them is not “just punishment.” To impose a just 
sentence on bottoms who commit trafficking offenses, judges must be able 
to consider the circumstances, including the traffickers’ power over the 
bottoms’ actions, to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary” under § 3553(a). Therefore, sentencing judges need an avenue 
by which they may consider all of the § 3553(a) factors and apply them 
without being bound by the high mandatory minimums. The only avenue 
presently available, the U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, is limited to considering 
cooperation with the government and must be initiated by the government, 
therefore leaving significant discretion to the federal prosecutors yet again.  
This is inadequate. 
The problem with mandatory minimum sentences in trafficking cases 
mirrors the problem with mandatory minimums in certain drug cases; 
Congress found mandatory minimums under drug statutes problematic 
when they applied equally to low-level offenders and drug kingpins.210 To 
remedy this incongruity, Congress created 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), a safety 
valve provision to exclude certain drug offenders from mandatory 
minimums, allowing courts to use the Sentencing Guidelines to determine 
an offender’s status.211 To be eligible, the defendant must: (1) have no more 
than one criminal history point, (2) have been unarmed and nonviolent, (3) 
not have caused death or serious injury to any person, (4) not have been a 
leader of others or engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, and (5) 
have provided the government with all of the information that he or she had 
relating to the offense.212  
208 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) requires that judges consider a list of factors when sentencing in 
order to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”   
209 H.R. REP. NO. 1030 (1984). 
210 132 CONG. REC. S14,301 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986) (statement of Sen. Byrd). 
211 Oliss, supra note 166, at 1884.  
212 § 3553(f); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2. 
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Congress should create a similar safety valve for bottoms charged 
with violating the federal sex trafficking statutes to recognize their lack of 
agency and criminal responsibility. Due to the more serious—and often 
more violent—nature of the crime, the safety valve eligibility criteria for 
bottoms would necessarily be different than those for the drug offense 
statutes, as discussed in the following Section.213  
A. Proposed Safety Valve
This Note proposes a statutory amendment similar to the first-time 
drug offender safety valve, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2,214 to create a safety valve for 
bottoms charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b), or 2423(a). If 
adopted, the safety valve would allow judges to employ their discretion and 
expertise in weighing sentencing factors, including a bottom’s lack of 
agency in committing the offense, to sentence bottoms below the 
mandatory minimums. The proposed safety valve includes the following 
requirements:  
(1) the defendant does not have more than five criminal history points
resulting from non-violent crimes, not including points from prostitution
or other offenses committed as a result of having been trafficked before
application of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b) (Departures Based on Inadequacy of
Criminal History Category);
(2) the defendant did not use violence unless coerced or forced by her
trafficker,215 and did not possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or
induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense;
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of
others in the offense—except when coerced by her trafficker as part of
her duties as lead prostitute—as determined under the sentencing
guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1,216 and was not engaged in a continuing
criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848; and
(5) the defendant “has complied with any reasonable request [by the
government] for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of acts of
severe forms of trafficking in persons,” including testifying against other
213 See infra Section IV.B for a more in-depth discussion of the burden of proof for each condition 
of the proposed safety valve.  
214 The safety valve for bottoms would include several necessary amendments from the first-time 
drug offender safety valve. 
215 Parts (2) and (4) of the safety valve would employ § 1591’s definition of coercion, “threats of 
serious harm to or physical restraint against any person [or] any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to 
believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any 
person.” § 1591. 
216 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
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perpetrators of severe forms of trafficking in persons on behalf of the 
government, unless unable to do so due to physical or psychological 
trauma.217 
With respect to Part (5), the reasonableness of the request depends on 
the totality of the circumstances. Factors to consider include, but are not 
limited to:  
(i) General law enforcement and prosecutorial practices; (ii) The nature of the
victimization [of the lead prostitute]; (iii) The specific circumstances of the
[lead prostitute]; (iv) Severity of trauma suffered (both mental and physical)
or whether the request would cause further trauma; (v) Access to support
services; (vi) The safety of the [lead prostitute] or the [lead prostitute’s]
family; (vii) Compliance with previous requests and the extent of such
compliance; (viii) Whether the request would yield essential information; (ix)
Whether the information could be obtained without the [lead prostitute’s]
compliance; (x) Whether an interpreter or attorney was present to help the
[lead prostitute] understand the request; (xi) Cultural, religious, or moral
objections to the request; (xii) The time the [lead prostitute] had to comply
with the request; and (xiii) The age and maturity of the [lead prostitute].218
Part (1) of the safety valve allows for up to five criminal history 
points. As discussed above,219 traffickers specifically target vulnerable 
victims, including drug addicts or homeless youth who may have 
committed burglaries or other crimes.220 The Sentencing Guidelines require 
adding 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment lasting at least 
sixty days, and 1 point for every other sentence of imprisonment, meaning 
that many victims likely acquire multiple criminal history points before 
being trafficked.221 Further, Part (1) would exclude from the 5-point 
calculation criminal history points from prostitution and other crimes 
resulting from having been trafficked, including drug charges following 
drug use that began while the bottom was being trafficked. As noted in 
Section III.B, bottoms likely have been incarcerated multiple times for 
prostitution prior to and while being trafficked. Although states may have 
their own safety valves for such offenses resulting from having been 
trafficked, it is necessary to create such an exception in the federal 
217 Alien Victims of Severe Forms of Trafficking in Persons, 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(b)(3)(ii), (h)(2) 
(2017). 
218 Id. 
219 See supra Part II. 
220 See, e.g., United States v. Mack, 808 F.3d 1074, 1078 (6th Cir. 2015) (detailing that the 
trafficker gave drugs to a victim for sex and forced her to prostitute herself to pay for more drugs); 
United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that the trafficker picked up a teenage 
runaway who had been using drugs and prostituting herself).  
221 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1(b)–(c) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
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Sentencing Guidelines. Codifying this exception in the Guidelines would 
permit bottoms with convictions resulting from the force, fraud, or coercion 
exercised upon them by their trafficker to invoke the safety valve to 
§§ 1591, 2422(b), or 2423(a).
Further, because traffickers often force bottoms to punish other
victims, Part (2) of the proposed safety valve would include an exception 
for using violence against other victims when the bottom was under force 
or threat of force to do so by her trafficker. This limited exception would 
prevent bottoms who might use violence against other victims for their own 
pleasure or benefit from being eligible for the safety valve. The exception 
is further limited by Part (3), which would require that the offense not 
result in death or serious bodily harm. Because bottoms, as a matter of 
definition, act as “leader[s], manager[s], or supervisor[s]” of others,222 Part 
(4) requires a qualification: bottoms acting in those roles when required to
do so by their traffickers remain eligible for the safety valve.
Some may argue that sex trafficking offenses committed by bottoms 
are much more serious and harmful than offenses committed by nonviolent, 
first-time drug offenders eligible for the safety valve on which the proposed 
safety valve is modeled; therefore bottoms should not be given a similar 
safety valve.223 However, the proposed safety valve would be available only 
to a bottom who acted under force, fraud, or coercion exercised upon her 
by her trafficker, thereby making her a victim of “[s]evere forms of 
trafficking in persons” as defined by the TVPA.224 If she had not been 
under the control or climate of fear of her trafficker, then the bottom would 
not have committed the trafficking offenses against other victims.225 
Part (5) of the proposed safety valve mirrors the language of the 
TVPA’s requirements for foreign victims’ assistance to law enforcement to 
be eligible for immigration relief and a “T-Visa,” including the definition 
of “reasonableness,” which considers characteristics of the victims, such as 
severe mental and physical traumatization.226 A “reasonable request” may 
include interviews with law enforcement, testifying before a grand jury, or, 
as specifically enumerated in the proposed amendment, testifying against 
other perpetrators at trial, unless the bottom is unable to do so due to 
222 Id. § 3B1.1 cmt. 2. 
223 See United States v. Nagel, 559 F.3d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that although drug 
offenses are serious, first-time drug offenders present differing degrees of risk to the community, while 
traffickers “who violate § 2422(b) always present a serious danger to children”).  
224 Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 7102(9)(A) (West 2015). 
225 Many of the terms of the safety valve are subjective, so an evidentiary hearing would be 
required for the court to determine whether the bottom qualifies.  
226 8 C.F.R. § 214.11 (2012). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
788 
physical or psychological trauma.227 This requirement would mitigate 
potential criticism from the government that the safety valve has removed 
the government’s leverage to make bottoms testify against their traffickers. 
However, the qualification that bottoms be exempted from the requirement 
due to physical or psychological trauma would alleviate concerns about 
retraumatization.228 Because the bottoms’ eligibility for the safety valve 
would be judicially determined at a sentencing hearing, the reasonableness 
of the government’s requests for assistance likewise would be reviewable, 
unlike a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 reduction.229  
B. Proving Eligibility for the Safety Valve
Although defendants often clearly meet the conditions of the first-time 
drug offender safety valve,230 Parts (2), (4), and particularly (5) of the 
proposed safety valve for bottoms contain subjective conditions that the 
government may contest, largely because of the strong need for bottoms’ 
testimony at trial.231 During the presentence investigation, the U.S. 
Probation Office would ask both parties where they stand on the issue and 
document their positions in the presentence report submitted to the court.232 
The defendant would bear the burden of establishing all five criteria by a 
preponderance of the evidence.233 However, if the government believes that 
the bottom does not meet all five criteria, then the government would have 
the opportunity to file a brief and provide information at sentencing stating 
why the bottom does not qualify for the safety valve.234 The defendant 
would be allowed to reply.235 Because of the particularly subjective nature 
of Part (5) of the proposed safety valve, the court would likely conduct an 
evidentiary hearing regarding the bottom’s compliance with government 
requests, the reasonableness of the request, and whether physical or 
psychological trauma prevented compliance.  
227 Id. 
228 Zraick, supra note 8. 
229 Judicial review of the government’s request would mitigate criticism about the arbitrariness of 
such requests for noncitizen victims seeking T-Visas. Benjamin Thomas Greer & Scott Davidson Dyle, 
Determining the Reasonableness of Non-Compliance: Examining the “Trauma Exception” for T-Visa 
Applicants, 15 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. RACE & SOC. JUST. 385, 430–31 (2013).  
230 E-mail from Lori C. Baker, Parole Officer, W.D. Wis. Parole Office (Mar. 18, 2016) (on file 
with author).  
231 See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text. 
232 E-mail from Lori C. Baker, supra note 230. 
233 Id. Often the defendant could prove she satisfied Part (5) by submitting a law enforcement 
agency declaration to the court. See Greer & Dyle supra note 229, at 394. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
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When the government disputes the bottom’s eligibility for the safety 
valve based on the bottom’s insufficient compliance with government 
request for assistance, the burden would shift and the government would 
bear the burden of proof to show that the bottom was noncompliant and 
that the request was reasonable. If the government succeeded in meeting its 
burden, the bottom then would need to prove that her noncompliance 
resulted from trauma. To determine whether the bottom has satisfied the 
Part (5)—and potentially Parts (1)–(4)—the court likely would hold an 
evidentiary hearing.236 To prove the reasonableness of the government 
request—which “depends on the totality of the circumstances” and the 
bottom’s physical or psychological trauma preventing compliance237—both 
parties might call expert witnesses. The government often calls experts to 
testify in sex trafficking cases: experts typically testify about the common 
dynamics present in sex trafficking operations, including the means 
traffickers use to maintain control over their victims and victims’ resulting 
mental health issues, including post-traumatic stress disorder.238 Both the 
government and defense could rely upon such experts at a sentencing 
hearing to testify about the bottom’s specific physical or psychological 
symptoms, whether the government’s requests for compliance were 
reasonable in light of such symptoms, and whether those symptoms 
prevented the bottom from complying with the government’s request, even 
if it was reasonable. The court would make the final determination 
regarding the bottom’s compliance with all five parts of the test. 
Therefore, creating a safety valve would give a bottom the opportunity 
to benefit from the court’s sentencing discretion in addition to the 
prosecutor’s charging and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 discretion. It would give her 
defense attorney an opportunity to argue that mitigating factors exist that 
the judge could consider. It also would allow the bottom to regain some of 
her agency by making a real choice between entering into a plea deal and 
fighting the charges at trial without the threat of an automatic ten- or 
fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence if convicted.239 The safety valve 
236 Id. (discussing the typical process for determining defendants’ eligibility for the drug offender 
safety valve).  
237 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.11 (2016). 
238 See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Anderson, 560 F.3d 275, 281–82 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Sutherland, 191 F. App’x 737, 741 
(10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Shamsud-Din, No. 10 CR 927, 2012 WL 280702, at *2–3, 9 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 31, 2012).  
239 See supra Section III.A. The first-time drug offender safety valve affected the number of guilty 
pleas defendants made: a study found that “the effect of guilty pleas and other guidelines departures on 
the length of actual imprisonment critically depended upon whether the defendant had qualified for the 
safety-valve provision.” Natasha Bronn, Note “Unlucky Enough to Be Innocent”: Burden-Shifting and 
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additionally may provide defense attorneys with greater leverage during 
plea negotiations to work out the best deal for their clients. Although Part 
(5) of the proposed safety valve still would require bottoms to comply with
the government’s “reasonable request[s],” including testifying at trial, the
court could review the exemption for physical or psychological trauma,
thereby mitigating much of the potential coercion resulting from
government pressure to cooperate. Although a judge could consider a
bottom’s cooperation as part of her overall determination of a fair and just
sentence, she also would be able to consider many other mitigating factors,
including the bottom’s age, vulnerabilities, and status as a trafficking
victim, to impose a fair and just sentence.240
CONCLUSION 
Although many people prosecuted for committing federal offenses 
have troubled backgrounds, a bottom who commits sex trafficking offenses 
constantly fears being subjected to severe violence and has lost her agency 
because her trafficker has made her his property. At the same time, a 
bottom should be punished appropriately for the crimes that she has 
committed against other victims. Nonetheless, appropriate punishment 
must consider the bottom’s lack of agency in committing those offenses, in 
recognition that she too is a victim, acting due to force, fraud, or coercion 
exercised upon her by her trafficker. A judge experienced in weighing 
sentencing factors, including a victim’s agency in committing offenses, 
should have available a Sentencing Guidelines safety valve that allows her 
to consider such factors when imposing a sentence. Leaving a bottom—a 
victim of trafficking herself—subject to only a prosecutor’s review of the 
facts of her case in determining whether she deserves to be subject to a ten- 
or fifteen-year minimum sentence is neither just nor fair. Therefore, 
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 3553 to include a safety valve 
provision for victims of trafficking who commit sex trafficking offenses. 
This provision would allow prosecutors and judges to incorporate their 
discretion, conscience, experience, and sense of justice into the sentencing 
procedure.  
Although reported cases demonstrate appropriate prosecutorial 
discretion when charging bottoms who commit trafficking crimes under the 
thumb of their traffickers, the societal—and prosecutorial—understanding 
of bottoms’ lack of agency in committing the offenses should be codified. 
the Fate of the Modern Drug Mule Under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) Statutory Safety Valve, 46 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 469, 483 (2013).
240 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
111:753 (2017) Stripping Agency 
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Such codification would cause the federal criminal justice system to 
recognize bottoms’ status as victims who lacked agency when committing 
offenses. Beyond that, recognizing bottoms’ victimization in law, similar to 
the TVPA’s recognition of trafficking victims as victims and not people 
willingly selling sex, makes a statement not only to the legal system, but 
also to the American public and foreign governments.  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
792 
